). Yet beyond mere accountability, Obama's rhetoric suggests that data and transparency can be positive instruments of public policy-a means of shaping social and economic behavior that differs qualitatively from fiscal incentives or regulatory punishments. As his 2013 Executive Order puts it, "making information resources easy to find, accessible, and usable can fuel entrepreneurship, innovation, and scientific discovery that improves Americans' lives and contributes significantly to job creation" (Obama 2013 ).
In the past year, the administration has begun to put its data initiatives to use-not only to monitor the performance of federal agencies, but also to alter policy debates in a variety of arenas. The Department of Education launched a College Scorecard, which will allow consumers to evaluate colleges and universities that receive federal funds with new metrics that evaluate affordability and labor-market outcomes (Turner 2015) . The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have also imposed new transparency requirements on doctors. They require the publication of consumer information on, among other things, "how reliably physicians provide follow-up care for depression and high blood pressure, and how well they monitor patients for healthy weight and tobacco use" (Evans 2015) . Such initiatives are animated by the idea that the state can leverage public knowledge as an instrument of public policy. Rather than directly prohibiting or incentivizing certain behaviors on the part of government officials or market actors, however, transparency programs work indirectly. The hope of transparency advocates is that information will either enable democratic publics (or government watchdogs) to mobilize behind new policies or permit consumers to (privately) alter their choices about consumption in the market.
Yet transparency programs have their classical downsides. As Francis Rourke put it in 1961, "there is no simple way of reconciling the conflicting claims of publicity, secrecy, and democracy" (Rourke 1961: 226) . Rather, as the books under review here suggest, transparency carries with it a distinctive politics. Given their symbolic value, "Open Government" initiatives are easy enough to enact. Yet in practice, such reforms contend with the entrenched incentives and habits of three vital sets of actors: the targets of transparency reforms themselves; government officials charged with deploying and implementing the tools of transparency; and the public audiences that these policies are intended to inform. Often, transparency programs fail to reshape how these actors behave, and hence fail to ignite meaningful changes in the direction or scope of public policy. In some cases, policymakers have also developed powerful new tools to restrict the flow of information, which remain outside the purview of sunshine laws altogether.
ENFORCING SUNSHINE
A core presumption of transparency advocates is that government programs can compel the production of information that is accurate, up-to-date, and focused on the appropriate empirical phenomena for the governing task at hand. However, were food manufacturers-to take one example-able to evade packaging requirements by giving new names to unsafe ingredients, it is doubtful that transparency would enable informed consumer choices. To work properly, freedom-of-information laws must make it difficult for government agencies or market actors to claim exemptions or invent new categories of private information. Otherwise, the information legislators or citizens can procure is unlikely to enable them to observe the behaviors such reforms seek to guard against, let alone influence policy.
Jason Ross Arnold's Secrecy in the Sunshine Era is the definitive account of why enforcing sunshine laws has proven to be so difficult. As Arnold argues, open government laws like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and the Public Records Act are politically popular, and are often enacted by broad majorities.
Nevertheless, these laws do little to change the culture of the officials they were designed to police. And since those officials are the ones with material possession of the files themselves, their beliefs and preferences matter. Among Executive Branch officials, a "governing ideology" that emphasized the value of secrecy for making good public policy persisted even after sunshine laws were passed. This ideology was arguably most pronounced during the Bush-Cheney administration, whose officials often articulated a "strong version of the unitary executive theory," in which the President's unique constitutional authority in matters of foreign policy allowed it to share information with Congress and the public on a strictly voluntary basis (41). Administration's wiretapping program, the culture of secrecy is baked into the day-to-day routines of some federal agencies. This raises the bar that any single reform will have to clear in order to be considered a success.
Arnold's analysis forces us to consider a pragmatic question about transparency reforms:
given the political consensus about "open government" as a tool for enhancing policy responsiveness in a democracy, why do such efforts often fail? The problem is that, while transparency programs mobilize constituencies from journalists to entrepreneurial watchdogs across the political spectrum, they often do little to alter the powerful incentives government officials have to protect information that allows them to shape the course of policy in a fragmented political system. If it is true that the preferences of bureaucratic agents-rather than legislative principals-are to blame, the search for "sunshine" cannot be limited to transparency policies alone. Indeed, Arnold's work suggests that a response to agents' entrenched preferences for secrecy-possibly in the process of recruitment, retention, and promotion-may be an important complementary reform.
COMBATING VISION LOSS
Of course, obstreperous officials are not solely responsible for ineffective transparency programs. While the idea of "open government" appears natural and spontaneous, an "original condition" of democratic societies, it does not happen in the absence of "boots on the ground." In practice, this means existence of a "monitor" who can not only compel the release of information to the public, but also translate "raw" data about action in government or the marketplace into meaningful public knowledge.
1 Monitors thus must know which information to procure, when to procure it, and how to ensure that its dissemination changes behavior, either through markets or politics. Gaining such knowledge, much less using it, requires substantial investment by legislative or regulatory principals. Yet these actors will be unlikely to make such efforts unless activities such as bureaucratic oversight and consumer protection allow them to build professional and political reputations.
There is a mountain of evidence on this point tucked within Watchdogs on the Hill, Linda to ensure the effective spending of money and to avoid misappropriation of funds (Hudak and Wallack 2015) . So while the demand for oversight must be balanced with other policy goals, greater attention is warranted to how fiscal and professional realities affect policymakers' desire to serve as monitors. As Fowler shows, we cannot ignore the difficulty of oversight in the face of legislative agendas, policy commitments, and professional incentives out of joint with the cause of transparency.
TRANSPARENCY CULTURE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
While government watchdogs are significant, the implementation of transparency reforms is not simply a matter for professionals or policy elites. A core assumption of the open-government philosophy is that the state can leverage the public itself as an instrument of policy change. By opening up market or government activity to public scrutiny, transparency reforms seek to improve the likelihood that citizens will become mobilized to address significant policy problems. Budget transparency programs, for example, seek to allow "citizens to play a key role in identifying, discussing, and prioritizing public spending projects" (Open Government
Partnership 2013: 10). Other measures-food-labeling or physician-rating initiatives, for instance-target consumers in the hope that they will use information to make more informed choices in the marketplace.
Given the public's important role in transparency reforms, the Obama Administration has made it a priority for government agencies to "identify key audiences" for their data and to "endeavor to publish high-value information for each of those audiences in the most accessible forms and formats" (Obama 2009 ). In an information-rich world, however, voters and consumers may still lack the resources, time, or taste for using the information that transparency initiatives produce (Lee et al. 2014) . Moreover, what historian Michael Schudson calls the "culture of transparency" -defined by a public preference for information and institutionalized practices of disclosure-is a more recent, and perhaps more fragile, development than it appears at first blush. Armed with a nuanced qualitative understanding of leadership-driven information control, Curry systematically examines 518 important bills for evidence of these tactics. In 29.5 percent of these cases, parties used a "restricted layover" tactic, in which the full text of legislation is made available to members for 24 hours or less before a floor vote. For 19.5 percent of the bills in Curry's data set, party leaders used the tactic of "self-execution," in which the House Rules Committee alters the contents of legislation through a procedural vote before a bill is considered on the floor. Finally, in 12.7 percent of the bills, party leaders significantly increased the complexity of legislation-often through creating massive omnibus bills or stuffing legislation with technical jargon. Party leaders use all of these tactics with greater frequency on legislation they consider a high priority, especially when organized interests and multiple congressional committees are attentive to a bill.
How does the restriction of information shape public policy? It empowers partisan elites.
When party leaders "turn out the lights," Curry shows that roll call votes divide more sharply along party lines. By restricting information, party leaders limit the ability of rank-and-file members to analyze the content of legislation and assess its proximity to their own preferences.
These tactics thus result in more responsible parties, yet they also limit input from rank and file members-and potentially constituents-on the content of legislation. Whatever normative conclusions one might draw from Legislating in the Dark, this book powerfully shows how information shapes the substance of public policy and the quality of democratic representation in the United States.
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AS PUBLIC POLICY?
Transparency advocates often assume that better access to information empowers government watchdogs, voters, and consumers to shape public policy. This view is premised on a belief in unorganized individuals' ability to process or aggregate information, or in government's willingness and capacity to translate information in ways that can be easily acted upon. For those who hold this belief, the books discussed here suggest a wide array of options to improve the "effectiveness" of transparency tools-from ensuring that officials charged with oversight have appropriate incentives and applying appropriate punishments for violating disclosure laws to designing transparency programs with a better sensitivity to how information will be used.
Yet these books also give us reason to doubt that transparency is the wide, well-paved, and toll-free road out of contemporary policy dilemmas that its most vociferous advocates claim.
As transparency has risen to prominence as a policy instrument, a series of new political disputes emerged over what information may be public, in what form, to whom, and at whose discretion.
These disputes carry three important lessons. First, the implementation of open government depends on legislative and bureaucratic infrastructures that were not built with transparency in mind. Those affected by the reforms also tend to find clever workarounds. To address these governance gaps, we need to better understand how government organizations enact new material practices of transparency, and why these practices sometimes fail to take hold (Worthy 2015) . Second, transparency measures appear to require healthy public appetites for information, despite persistent voter and consumer myopia. As such, we need to know more about how publics become more effectively enrolled in the implementation of open government.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the limits of transparency as a policy instrument, we need to think more carefully about the political conditions of its use-especially as an
